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RECENT CASES
PRODUCTS LIABILITY - STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT -
BOTH THE MANUFACTURER AND THE RETAILER
ARE STRICTLY LIABLE IN TORT FOR PERSONAL IN-
JURIES CAUSED BY A DEFECT IN A PRODUCT MAR-
KETED WITH THE KNOWLEDGE THAT IT IS TO BE
USED WITHOUT INSPECTION FOR DEFECTS. Vander-
mark v. Ford Motor Co. (Cal. 1964).
Plaintiff purchased a new Ford automobile from the defendant
retailer. A defect in the brakes of the car caused an accident in
which the purchaser and a passenger sustained injuries. They
brought actions for negligence and breach of implied warranties
against both the auto manufacturer and the retail dealer. The trial
court granted a nonsuit in favor of the manufacturer, and a verdict
for the retailer. The Supreme Court of California reversed, holding
that if a manufacturer markets a product with the knowledge that
it is to be used without inspection for defects, both the manufac-
turer and the retailer are strictly liable in tort for personal injuries
caused by a defect in the product. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,
61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
In factual situations such as that presented by Vandermark, the
negligence of either the manufacturer or the retailer is very often
extremely difficult to prove.' When negligence cannot be estab-
lished, the victim is without a remedy unless strict liability can be
imposed upon the defendant in an action for breach of warranties,
either expressed or implied. However, a suit for breach of warranty
is replete with difficulties created by the fact that a warranty, being
contractual in nature, is governed by contractual considerations. One
such contractual sine qua non, which has constantly presented an
obstacle to recovery, is the requirement that the injured party be in
privity of contract with the person from whom he seeks to recover.
In their attempts to circumvent this requirement, the courts have
submerged the warranty theory in a morass of fictions, exceptions
and extensions.
At early common law, breach of warranty was a tort sounding in
deceit.2 It was not until the 18th Century that the contract action
was recognized, 3 and then only with respect to breaches of express
warranties.4 Later, from the action for breach of an implied war-
X In such cases proof of negligence is usually based upon the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. This theory is likely to be insufficient when the product has been subject
to the control of a number of parties. See PRossER, TORTS 225-28 (3d ed. 1964).
2 Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HItv. L. Rav. 1, 8 (1888).
3 Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Doug. 18, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778) ; Prosser, The Im-
plied Wfarranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117, 119-20 (1943).
4 Prosser, supra note 3, at 119-20.
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ranty of title, which had been recognized as a tort as early as the
18th Century, there evolved the action for breach of an implied
warranty of quality.5 But since the enforcement of any warranty had
by then come to be regarded as an action in assumpsit, strict con-
tractual rules were applied. Not the least of these was the require-
ment of privity.
The doctrinal stranglehold of the privity requirement was first
loosened in actions involving personal injuries caused by the con-
sumption of unfit food and food products. The early cases sought to
surmount the privity obstacle by finding some relationship between
the parties which would bring the victim within the contractual
framework. But the utilization for this purpose of theories of
agency, assignment, or third party beneficiary contracts produced
results which were sometimes startling. For example, in one case a
woman purchased pork chops for herself and her husband. The
chops were tainted, and both became ill after eating them. In order
to establish privity of contract between the husband and the retailer,
it was alleged that the wife was her husband's agent. This theory
was accepted, and the husband was allowed recovery. But it was
held that the wife, on the other hand, being merely an agent, was
not in privity with the vendor and recovery for her was denied.' In
another case, where the purchaser consumed a soft drink containing
a decomposed mouse, Missouri held the manufacturer liable. Al-
though the entrenched law limited recovery in such circumstances to
an assignee of the warranty, the court stated that, "[U]nder the
situation and circumstance of modern merchandise [sic] in such
matters, privity of contract exists in the consciousness and under-
standing of all right-thinking persons."8 In 1928 the Ohio Supreme
Court employed the theory of third party beneficiary contracts to
hold a baking company liable for injuries caused by a pin baked
into one of its cakes.' The court stated that the company knew that
the retailer was not purchasing for its own consumption, and since
the retailer purchased such goods for ultimate resale to customers,
any warranty arising from the sale by the company to the retailer
was for the benefit of the consumer.1"
California first relaxed the privity requirement in a case involving
a packaged sandwich which contained maggots. Consumption of the
5 Id. at 120.
6 Ibid.
7 Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N.E. 785 (1916).
8 Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 283, 90
S.W.2d 445, 450 (1936).
9 Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
10 Id. at 475, 161 N.E. at 559.
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sandwich caused the purchaser's wife to become violently ill. The
court, permitting the wife to recover against both the manufacturer
and the retailer, stated that although privity is usually required to
maintain an action for breach of warranty, an exception to this re-
quirement exists when the product involved can be classified as food
or drug." Other states followed this exception, and by 1955 it was
recognized by at least 15 states." Not content with this development,
the courts expanded the scope of the original exception to permit
recovery without privity for a wide spectrum of products designed
for intimate bodily use, such as vaccine,13 tobacco,1' soap,15 deter-
gent,"0 hair dye," permanent wave solution,"8 and clothing. 9 The
expansion of the exception in California has encompassed dog
food," milk bottles,21 and food cartons.
22
Many courts have also allowed consumers to recover for breach
of express warranties created by representations made on labels, in
sales literature, and other advertising media. Another prevalent
exception to the privity requirement has been applied in those cases
where the product, if defective, would be inherently dangerous to
th consuming public. Under this doctrine recovery has been granted
21 Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939).
12 California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennyslvania, Texas, and Washington.
PRossER, ToRTs 508-09 (2d ed. 1955).
23 Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320
(1960).
14 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961) (by
implication) ; Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.
1963) (tobacco classified as within food and drink category).
15 Kruper v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 113 N.E.2d 605 (Ohio App. 1953), rev'd
on other grounds, 160 Ohio St. 489, 117 N.E.2d 7 (1954).
26 Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961); Worley v. Proctor &
Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952) (rev'd on other
grounds).
17 Graham v. Bottenfield's Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954); Esborg v.
Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wash. 2d 347, 378 P.2d 298 (1963).
1s Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958);
Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181
(1958).
19 Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, Brown v. Chap-
man, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962) (hula skirt); Martin v. J. C. Penney Co.,
50 Wash. 2d 560, 313 P.2d 689 (1957) (by implication).
20 McAfee v. Cargill Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
21 Vassallo v. Sabatte land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1963).
22 Faucette v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 219 Cal. App. 2d 196, 33 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1963)
(by implication).
23 E.g., Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961); Prosser, Strict
Liability To The Consumer, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1135-36 & nn. 212-14 (1960).
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for injuries resulting from defects in airplanes, 4 hot water heaters,"5
bottles, " and tires.2"
Not only have exceptions been based on the type of product in-
volved, but there has also been an augmentation of the class of
plaintiffs allowed to recover for a breach of either an express or
implied warranty. In recent years the courts have amplified the cause
of action for breach of warranty to include members of the pur-
chaser's family,"8 members of his "industrial family,"29 his house-
hold guests,"0 and foreseeable users in general.3 ' This trend is exem-
plified by section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code which
extends a seller's warranty whether express or implied to, "... any
natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or
who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such
person may use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty."
' 2
There has been a definite contemporary trend toward the imposi-
tion of strict liability in tort upon the manufacturer. The concepts,
the language, and the emphasis of the courts have been increasingly
those of tort." Dean Prosser has stated that the warranty theory is
a, "freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract,"3
and has appealed for a blanket rule which would make any supplier
in the chain liable directly to the ultimate consumer.3 " California, it
would appear, adopted most of Dean Prosser's suggestion in the
case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc."6 In Greenman the
24 Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
25 Deveny v. Rheem. Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963).
26 Vallis v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 2d 35, 11 Cal. Rptr. 823
(1961).
27 B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959).
28 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 414, 161 A.2d 69, 100
(1960).
29 Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 347, 353 P.2d 575, 581, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 863, 869 (1960).
80 Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963).
31 Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 436-37, 191 N.E.2d 81,
82-83, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 594-95 (1963).
32 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318. When enacting the Uniform Commercial
Code, the California Legislature omitted § 2-318 because California case law had
already gone beyond the limitations of that section. CI., Marsh & Warren, Report
on Proposed Amendments To The Uniform Commercial Code, SENATE FACr
FnING Comm. ON JUDICIARY, SIXTH PaOGREss REPORT To THE [California]
LEGISLATURE, PART 1-THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, ch. VII 436, 457-58
(1961).
33 See Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aft'd, Brown v.
Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710,
174 A.2d 294 (1960); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191
N.X.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
34 Prosser, supra note 22, at 1126.
35 Id. at 1124.
36 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
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plaintiff's injury resulted from a defect in a lathe which had been
purchased for him by his wife. The court transcended most of the
traditional contractual restrictions which had encrusted actions for
breach of warranty and held that, "A manufacturer is strictly liable
in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is
to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect
which causes injury to a human being." 7 Greenman expressly states
that the manufacturer's liability is to be governed not by the law of
contract warranties, but by the law of strict liability in tort. 8 Accord-
ingly, it was held that the notice requirement of the California Civil
Code39 was inapplicable because the liability arises independently of
a contract of sale between the parties."0
The Vandermark case is the cap-stone of the evolutionary process.
In a brief opinion written by Justice (now Chief Justice) Traynor,
the court held that if a manufacturer markets a product with knowl-
edge that-it is to be used without inspection for defects, there is
strict liability in tort for personal injuries caused by a defect in the
product and that this liability will be imposed not only on the manu-
facturer but also on the retailer. A disclaimer of any or all warran-
ties in the sales contract will not avoid the liability of either the
manufacturer or the retailer; nor will failure of the buyer to give
timely notice of the breach of any warranty, whether express or
implied. Undoubtedly, strict liability in tort is now the rule in
California.
The doctrine of strict liability laid down by Vandermark is ex-
pressly intended to be independent of any reliance on theories of
breach of warranty. It will be interesting to observe the extent to
which the California courts, in applying the rules of strict liability
in tort, will limit or extend the doctrine. Until now, the plaintiffs
(including those in Vandermark) who have been permitted to re-
cover have been limited to foreseeable users who sustained personal
injuries. Recovery for property damage on a strict liability basis has
since been denied in Seely v. White Motor Co.," which pointed out
that the Vandermark court, while granting recovery for personal in-
jury, failed to mention the property damage to Vandermark's auto-
mobile. Although the status of innocent bystanders is doubtful,4 2 it
is conceivable that they may in the future be allowed to recover for
personal injuries which are proximately caused by a defective prod-
37 Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
38 Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
39 Cal. Stat. 1931, ch. 1070, § 1769, at 2249 (now CAL. COMM'L CODE § 2607 (3));
Cf., UNIFORM SLa.s AcT § 49.
40 59 Cal. 2d at 61, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
41 228 Adv. Cal. App. 851, 39 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1964).
42 Prosser, supra note 22, at 1142.
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uct because the rules of strict liability in tort do not discriminate
between purchaser, consumer, and bystander as do the contractual
rules of breach of warranty. With regard to defenses, the nature of
strict liability would exclude ordinary contributory negligence since
such an action is not one based upon negligence.43 Moreover, recent
indications are that the affirmative defense of assumption of the risk
will also be inapplicable.44
Although there is reason to believe that the court in Vandermark
assumed negligence, 5 the basis of the liability is not culpability but
public policy; i.e., the public interest in preserving human life and
health which justifies the imposition of full responsibility upon the
supplier for the harm caused by his product, despite his lack of
negligence.46 In our highly developed state of industry and market-
ing, strict liability is necessary to protect those who are unable ade-
quately to protect themselves against products which are danger-
ously defective. Industrialists and businessmen, by virtue of the rule
expounded in Vandermark, are forced to accept risks and responsi-
bilities which are concomitant with the products they make and sell.
The court, in recognizing the added burdens and expenses which
will be the lot of the manufacturer and retailer as a result of its
decision, did not overlook the fact that the added costs can be ad-
justed and absorbed as a business expense. The notable achievement
of Vandermark is the directness with which it affords increased pro-
tection to the consumer in an area where in the past he was without
a remedy. Other jurisdictions would do well to make the same forth-
right leap.
Edward V. Brennan
43 Id. at 1147-48; 4., Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 814 (1963); Kassouf v. Lee Bros., Inc., 209 Cal. App. 2d 568, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 276 (1962).
44 Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The Road To and Past
Vandermark, 38 So. CAL. L. Rav. 30, 54 (1965); see Alvarez v. Felker Mfg.
Co., 230 Adv. Cal. App. 1060, 1069, 41 Cal. Rptr. 514, 519 (1964) which states
that in order to establish a prima facie case of strict liability in tort, the plaintiff
must show that he was unaware of a defect in the product. Plaintiff therefore has
the burden of proving his own lack of knowledge. Assumption of the risk, on
the other hand, would require the defendant to prove that the plaintiff knew of
the particular danger involved; yet any showing of such knowledge would destroy
the plaintiffs prima facie case, and would obviate the presentment of assumption
of the risk as a defense.
45 "Moreover, since it could reasonably be inferred from the description of the brak-
ing system in evidence and the offer of proof of all possible causes of defects
that the defect was owing to negligence in design, manufacture, assembly, or
adjustment, it must be taken as established that the defect was caused by some
such negligence." 61 Cal. 2d at 260, 391 P.2d at 170, 37 Cal. Rptr. at' 898.
46 Seely v. White Motor Co., 228 Adv. Cal. App. 851, 863, 39 Cal. Rptr. 805, 811
(1964); Prosser, supra note 22, 1122.
